

DDP-4-5792a
ER-11-3061

Mr. Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Dear Mr. Gray:

25X1X6
[REDACTED] has furnished information on discussions which Latin American delegates to the 21st Congress of the CPSU had with Soviet officials [REDACTED] and with Chinese leaders [REDACTED]. I am certain that this report, a copy of which is attached, will be of interest to you.

Soviet leaders showed sensitivity to Free World propaganda exposing their control of the international Communist movement. It was decided that Communist literature would no longer make reference to CPSU leadership and direction, or the need to defend the Soviet Union, although the Soviets of course remain in control.

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An interesting development was Mao's request that thought be given to the union of several small Latin American countries in one national entity, in order to strengthen the fight against "imperialism". There is no indication that the Soviets raised this matter with the Latin American delegates.

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25X1X4Pa□

A copy of this report has been furnished to the Vice President; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as to General Goodpastor.

Sincerely,

/s/
C. F. Cabell
General, USAF
Acting Director

1 Attachment

25X1A2g

25X1A2g

Letter to the Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs from DCI dated 11 Apr '59 transmitting
[REDACTED] re Latin American Communist Party
Delegations in Moscow and Communist China.

SIGNATURE RECOMMENDED:

25X1A9a

P/ [REDACTED] 10 Apr '59
Deputy Director (Plans) Date

Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff Date

25X1A9a

DDP [REDACTED] mah (9 Apr 59)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

2 - DCI

1 - DDCI

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25X1A8a

SDP- 4-5142L
ER- 11-3055

The Vice President
United States Senate
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Vice President:

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25X1X4

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Sincerely,

15/
C. P. Cabell
General, USAF
Acting Director

1 Attachment

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2

25X1A2g00040009-6

Letter to The Vice President from DCI dated 11 Apr '59
transmitting [REDACTED] re Latin American Communist
Party Delegations in Moscow and Communist China.

SIGNATURE RECOMMENDED:

25X1A9a-b

11 Apr
[REDACTED]
Deputy Director (Plans) Date

Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff Date

25X1A9a

DDP [REDACTED] mah (9 Apr 1959)

10 Apr
[REDACTED] 25X1A9a

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

2 - DCI

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25X1A8a

1 - [REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]

✓ 1 - [REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]

DDP- 4 - 51420
ER- 11 - 3054

The Honorable Christian A. Herter
Acting Secretary of State
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Herter:

25X1X6 [REDACTED] has furnished information on discussions which Latin American delegates to the 21st Congress of the CPSU had with Soviet officials 25X1X6 [REDACTED] and with Chinese leaders 25X1X6 [REDACTED]. I am certain that this report, a copy of which is attached, will be of interest to you.

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25X1X4

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To General Goodpastor

Sincerely,

/s/

C. P. Cabell
General, USAF
Acting Director

1 Attachment

25X1A2g

25X1A2g

Letter to the Acting Secretary of State from DCI dated 11 Apr. 59
transmitting [REDACTED] re Latin American Communist
Party Delegations in Moscow and Communist China.

25X1A9a

SIGNATURE RECOMMENDED:

[REDACTED]
10 Apr
Deputy Director (Plans) Date

Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff Date

25X1A9a

DDP [REDACTED] mah (9 Apr 59)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

2 - DCI

1 - DDCI

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25X1A8a

DDP- 4- 5142d
ER- 11- 3057

The Honorable Neil M. McElroy
The Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. McElroy:

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General, USAF
Acting Director

1 Attachment

25X1A2g

2

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transmitting [REDACTED] re Latin American Communist
Party Delegations in Moscow and Communist China.

25X1A9aR

SIGNATURE RECOMMENDED:

[REDACTED]
Deputy Director (Plans)

10 Apr.
Date

Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Date

25X1A9a

DDP, [REDACTED] mah (9 Apr 1959)

10 Apr.
[REDACTED] 25X1A9aR

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

2 - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - DDP

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1 - [REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]

25X1A8a

DDP-7-3172 E

ER-11-3060

General Nathan F. Twining
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Department of Defense
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear General Twining:

~~25X1X6~~ [REDACTED] has furnished information on discussions which Latin American delegates to the 21st Congress of the CPSU had with ~~25X4X6~~ officials [REDACTED] and with Chinese leaders [REDACTED]. I am certain that this report, a copy of which is attached, will be of interest to you.

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Sincerely,

1/2
C. F. Cabell
General, USAF
Acting Director

1 Attachment

25X1A2g

2

Letter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from DCI
dated 11 Apr. 59 transmitting [REDACTED] re Latin
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Communist China.

SIGNATURE RECOMMENDED:

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] 10 Apr. 59
Deputy Director (Plans) Date

Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff Date

25X1A9aed

DDP [REDACTED] mah (9 Apr 59)

25X1A9a-

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

2 - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - 25X1A8a

1 - [REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]

ER-11-3058

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

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I shall appreciate it if you will restrict access to this sensitive report.

A copy of this report has been furnished to the Vice President; the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as to General Goodpastor.

Sincerely,

1/7
C. P. Cabell
General, USAF
Acting Director

1 Attachment 25X1A2g
[REDACTED]

25X1C10b

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001100040009-6

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001100040009-6

DDP-4-51429
ER-11-3059

Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster
Staff Secretary
The White House

Dear General Goodpaster:

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C. P. Cabell
General, USAF
Acting Director

1 Attachment

25X1A2g

Letter to Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, Staff Secretary, The
25X1A2g White House, from DCI dated 11 Apr 59 transmitting
[redacted] re Latin American Communist Party Delegations
in Moscow and Communist China.

SIGNATURE RECOMMENDED:

25X1A9a (Identical letter signed by
[redacted] on 10 Apr 59
A/ Deputy Director (Plans) Date

14
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff Date

25X1A9a

DDP [redacted] mah (13 Apr 59)

15
Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

2 - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - DDP 25X1A8a

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

SUBJECT: (Optional)			
FROM:		NO.	
<div>ER</div>		DATE	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. 25X1A8a [redacted]	APR 15 1959	<i>JS</i>	<p>Attached copy of referenced Report is DDCI's copy, returned on 13 Apr 59 to C/CI.</p> <p>Note that letter and attachment also went to ^{Gen} Goodpaster.</p> <p>1-2,3 Note</p> <p>Also, the transmittal letter went as we had written it.</p>
2. Chief, [redacted] 25X1A8a		<i>JS</i>	
3. Deputy Chief, [redacted]		<i>JS</i>	
4. 25X1A8a 25X1A8a			
5. [redacted]			
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